The Constitutional Duty–Administrative Capacity Gap in Forest Governance: Indonesia and Brazil Compared

Abstract

Environmental constitutionalism obliges states not only to recognise ecological rights and duties but also to equip administrative institutions with the capacity to give them effect. This article examines how constitutional environmental duties are translated into forest governance in Indonesia and Brazil, combining comparative doctrinal analysis with empirical evidence from UPTD KPH Region IV North Gorontalo. In both jurisdictions, constitutional recognition does not by itself secure forest protection, but the two systems manage the resulting gap differently. Indonesia's unitary-decentralised model concentrates broad protective mandates in provincial Forest Management Units while dispersing coercive authority and resources; in North Gorontalo, nine forest-police officers cover approximately 110,811 hectares. Brazil's federal model pairs common environmental competence with statutory cooperation instruments, satellite-based enforcement, and a constitutional jurisprudence that treats the erosion of enforcement capacity as a constitutional concern, although its record also shows that such capacity is reversible. The article conceptualises this mismatch as a constitutional duty–administrative capacity gap, specifies when such a gap becomes a problem of constitutional implementation, and derives three principles: responsibility–capacity correspondence, alignment of authority and accountability, and cooperative environmental administration. Environmental constitutionalism, it concludes, remains institutionally incomplete unless the constitutionalisation of environmental duties is matched by the institutionalisation of administrative capability.